Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements Paperback - 2012

From the rear cover

"This fine book by two leading political scientists provides an insightful look at the domestic politics behind preferential trading arrangements. The book is a significant contribution to our understanding of these trade agreements, and economists and political scientists alike will benefit from reading it."--Douglas Irwin, Dartmouth College

"This book's topic is of tremendous importance to students and researchers in international relations, international economics, and international law. Mansfield and Milner use a clear research design to persuasively show that democratic countries are more likely to sign preferential trading arrangements, but that as the number of veto players increases the likelihood of such agreements decreases."--Mark S. Manger, author of Investing in Protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements between North and South

"Preferential trading arrangements are an increasingly important component of the global political economy, yet our understanding of their consequences far outstrips our knowledge of their origins. Mansfield and Milner do much to rectify this situation. By combining penetrating theorizing, far-reaching data collection, and rigorous analysis, they provide deep insights into how, when, and why democratic politics bring about international trade agreements."--David Leblang, University of Virginia, coauthor of Democratic Processes and Financial Markets