Pacific Campaign: World War II--The U.S.-Japanese Naval War 1941- 1945 by Dan Van der Vat - 1991

Simon & Schuster. Good. 165 x 245mm. Hardcover. 1991. 448 pages. Ex-library.<br>Uses documents from the Naval Historica l Center to reassess the war in the Pacific and reveal the long h istory of conflict between Japanese imperialism and American mani fest destiny Editorial Reviews From Publishers Weekly Van der V at ( The Atlantic Campaign ) traces the economic, diplomatic and social developments that led Japan to war in the 1930s and turned the U.S. into its main enemy in the 1940s. His fast-paced narrat ive, augmented with such brief personal accounts as an eyewitness report of an American POW's beheading, is related largely from t he viewpoint of high-level U.S. commanders, both at the strategic level (admirals Ernest King and Chester Nimitz, Gen. Douglas Mac Arthur) and the tactical (admirals Raymond Spruance and William H alsey). Van der Vat is decidedly outspoken, referring to the will ful stupidity of the Japanese in calling MacArthur a mountebank, and demanding to know why the Americans didn't bypass Micronesia, the Palaus and even the Philippines in their great counteroffens ive. He also takes up issues long ignored: for example, MacArthur 's arbitrary sidelining of the superb, battle-hardened Australian army and the British navy's attempt to muscle in on the climacti c American victories. A fresh and very lively look at the war in the Pacific. BOMC selection; History Book Club alternate. Copyri ght 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Library Journal Th is provocative, well-written survey brings to bear a British pers pective on the U.S. Navy's war with Japan. Van der Vat describes that war as a product of Japanese aggression rather than American provocation. He insists there was a significant moral gap betwee n U.S. lapses of judgment and behavior and a Japanese ethic that justified and systemized atrocities. He also maintains the superi ority of a single-front strategy to the two-pronged counterattack America actually mounted. This decision van der Vat credits to D ouglas MacArthur, whom he dismisses as the supreme Allied confide nce man. Even readers who disagree with van der Vat's strategic a nalysis will admire his skills as an operational historian. Midwa y and Guadalcanal, Leyte Gulf, and the submarine campaign, are de scribed with verve and clarity, making this book especially worth while for general readers. Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 8/91, an d in The Day of Infamy in Print, LJ 9/1/91. - D.E. Showalter, U.S . Air Force Acad., Colorado Springs Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc. .