Careers After Congress: Do Jobseeking Legislators Shortchange Constituents? by Matthew S. Dabros - 2017

Praeger, 2017. Hardbound. New Book. Hardbound. The author challenges the idea that US Congress members serve special interest groups in return for high-paying jobs in industry once they leave office and that they become lax in their final terms when providing representation to citizens. He claims that special interests help to constrain them instead by judging poor last-period performance and refusing to hire politicians who deviated from constituents’ expectations in their last term, so that they take their representation seriously. He examines the relationship between the last-period behaviors and post-legislative careers of senators and representatives who left Congress between 2001 and 2011 and describes how elections compel legislators to behave loyally toward constituents, how exiting members thwart their constituents interests in the absence of this constraint, and motivational differences between retiring and job-seeking legislators; what senators and representatives do after leaving Congress; whether the absence of non-electoral constraints allows retiring members to reduce their efforts, while job seekers do not; whether lawmakers alter their policy preferences; and the factors involved in helping legislators get jobs in lobbying, the private sector, or government. (2017 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR)