The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam

New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1991. First Edition First Printing Stated . Hard Back. Fine/Good. 6 1/4" X 9 3/4. Carouge, Scott - Jacket Design. 444 Pages with Comprehensive Index. Black boards with green cloth quarter-spine with silver spine lettering. Brand new condition book illustrated with 14 page center photograph section. Dust jacket has a one-inch tear at the bottom spine area. The question of how the United States became enmeshed in the Vietnam War has troubled three generations of Americans. Now, in this incisive and documented history of American intervention in Vietnam from the end of World War II to the first months of John F. Kennedy's presidency, the author presents the dramatic unfolding of the events by which Washington led us into Vietnam. At no point along this way did any policymaker consider the ultimate result of this course or seriously heed those who counseled caution. This book is based on archival research and taps heretofore unused sources. Arnold's findings are both surprising and shocking. At the end of World War II, pro-European State Department officials outmaneuvered the Asian specialists and, taking advantage of President Harry S. Truman's woeful lack of experience, reversed American policy and obtained U.S. backing for France's effort to reclaim its colonies in Indochina. Ho Chi Minh's repeated overtures to the United States met with deafening silence; fear of communism and lack of knowledge of the region dominated all other considerations in Washington. The State Department, not the Pentagon, was the prime architect of Vietnam policy and consistently overrode the military's very sensible preconditions for aid to the French forces. French leaders, and later President Diem of South Vietnam, obtained increasing amounts of U.S. aid without listening to American advice or concerns or even effectively using the war materiel when it was delivered. Millions of dollars of equipment decayed in warehouses or was exposed to the tropical climate in vast open air holding dumps. Military intervention became a serious policy alternative as early as the 1950s. President Dwight D. Eisenhower came within hours of ordering direct attacks on Viet Minh positions surrounding Dien Bien Phu but was deterred only by a lack of British support. Arnold, in revealing the politics behind the critically important decision to train the South Vietnamese Army, tells how the phrase domino theory came into use. In one of the most startling sections of the book, the author details the way the wily Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the CIA saved President Diem from his vastly stronger opposition. Once American prestige was committed, there was no turning back. In the late 1940s, George F. Kennan observed that a great power lost more by suffering defeat in a war than by backing out early on. Throughout the growth of American involvement, no one remembered this wisdom. Arnold concludes that the average American soldier performed as well in Vietnam as in any war in American history. To discover what went wrong, he looked to the political leadership, and The First Domino is the result of that investigation.