Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965. Fourth Printing [stated]. Trade paperback. Good. 25 cm. xvi, [4], 426, [2] pages. Name in ink, obscured, on half-title page. Cover has some wear and soiling. Some edge soiling. Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling Note on Rank. Maps and Charts. Footnotes. Appendix, Abbreviations and Special Names. Bibliography. Index. Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence in the Pacific theater? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a position to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. As this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions, some were slowed by bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. No one had a complete picture. Roberta Mary Morgan, better known by her married name of Roberta Wohlstetter (August 22, 1912 - January 6, 2007), was one of America's most important historians of military intelligence. Her most influential work is Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Donald Rumsfeld, is said to have required that his aides read it. Wohlstetter worked for the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1965 and consulted with them through 2002. For decades the controversy has raged: Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence by military officers in the Pacific theater? Was it, as some have claimed, a deliberate plot by the President in Washington? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a position to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. Most of the time Washington was able to predict both Japan's diplomatic moves and its military deployments. But, as this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions toward a Japanese advance southward or into Siberia; some were slowed by the normal barriers of bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. At the center of the decision no one had completed the puzzle. Above all, this book reminds us sharply that detecting a surprise attack will be more difficult in the era of the H-bomb. As the Foreword states: "The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely."