The Strategy of Conflict.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960. First edition of this work that pioneered the study of bargaining and strategic behavior. Octavo, original yellow cloth. Presentation copy, inscribed by Thomas Schelling on the title page. Near fine in a very good dust jacket that has some chipping and wear to the extremities. Rare in the original dust jacket and inscribed. Against the backdrop of the nuclear arms race in the late 1950s, Thomas Schelling's book The Strategy of Conflict set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Schelling showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. Schelling's work prompted new developments in game theory and accelerated its use and application throughout the social sciences. Notably, his analysis of strategic commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of firms to the delegation of political decision power" (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences). Chosen as one of the hundred books most influential since the War by the Times Literary Supplement. In 2005, Schelling shared the Nobel Prize in Economics for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.