British Intelligence in the Second World War; Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Volume Three, Part II

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Presumed First U.S. Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Good/Good. xvi, 1038, [2] pages. Volume 3, Part 2 ONLY. Color endpaper maps. Abbreviations. Maps (many fold-out with color). Footnote. Appendices. Bibliography. Series Prefixes and Delivery Groups used for SCU/SLU Signals to Command. Index. Correction slip for pages 865/6 present. DJ has some wear, tears and soiling. Sir Francis Harry Hinsley OBE (26 November 1918 - 16 February 1998) was a historian and cryptanalyst. He worked at Bletchley Park during the WWII and wrote widely on the history of international relations and British Intelligence during the WWII. Hinsley helped initiate a programme of seizing Enigma machines and keys from German weather ships, such as the Lauenburg, thereby facilitating Bletchley Park's resumption of breaking of German Naval Enigma. Hinsley produced, with others, the multi-volume official history British Intelligence in the Second World War, and argued that Enigma decryption speeded Allied victory by 1-4 years while not altering the war's outcome. This second part of Volume 3 assesses the intelligence that was available before and during the Normandy landings, the fighting on the Russian fronts and in Yugoslavia, the war in the Mediterranean, U-boat warfare, the war in the air and the V-weapons offensives. Volume 3 is above all else concerned with the influence exerted by intelligence on the decision making process. It illustrated in fascinating detail the several layers and directions of intelligence, from the wrestling of information from the enemy to the point where the distilled and evaluated information was presented to political leaders and military commanders. This Official History will be the standard authority on this fascinating subject for many years to come.