The Palace File

New York: Harper & Row, c1986. First Edition. First Printing. Hardcover. Very good/Very good. 25 cm, xiv, [2], 542, [2] pages. Endpaper maps. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Interviews. Selected Readings. Index. Minor soiling on bottom edge. Nguy n Ti n H ng (also known as Gregory Tien Hung Nguyen) (born November 1, 1935) was Minister of Economic Development and Planning in the Republic of Vietnam and one of President Nguy n V n Thi u's closest advisers. As of 2010, he is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Howard University in Washington, D.C. He was born in Thanh Hóa, Vietnam, in 1935. He worked as an economist in Africa with the International Monetary Fund from 1966 to 1969, before being appointed "special assistant" to President Thi u and Commissioner of Planning in 1973. He was named Minister of Economic Development and Planning on November 28, 1974. In an attempt to force President Richard Nixon to honor what he and President Thi u interpreted as promises of heavy American military aid should the war go badly, H ng made public a series of letters which Nixon had sent to Thi u in 1972 and 1973. With Jerrold L. Schecter, former White House correspondent and diplomatic editor of Time magazine, Nguy n wrote The Palace File in 1986, which published the Nixon-Thi u letters and provided additional insight on America's relationship with South Vietnam from his perspective. One reviewer said the book "provides significant new data on United States relations with South Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 and fresh insights into the character of Nguyen Van Thieu." Derived from a Kirkus review: A former advisor to South Vietnamese President Thieu and a former diplomatic editor of Time relate in dramatic style an aspect of American interactions with South Vietnam. The file consists of 31 letters written by Presidents Nixon and Ford to Thieu from 1971-75. The letters promise America's full diplomatic and military support to the South Vietnamese regime both before and after the signing of the Paris Accords. That this support never materialized, the authors argue, speaks loudly of the untrustworthiness of American diplomacy. What is more interesting here is their explication of the war from the South Vietnamese point-of-view, a rare look into the psyches of men and women caught up like pawns in a struggle finally determined by the interests of the superpowers involved. The authors finish their presentation with full reproductions of the letters. A fascinating, acerbic, and valuable account of international diplomacy at its darkest.