German Panzers on the Offensive; Russian Front - North Africa, 1941-1942

Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2003. First Edition, First Printing. Hardcover. Very good/Very good. 224 pages. Frontis illustration. Figures. Maps. illustrations. Includes chapters on Panzer Maneuver War on the Plains of the Western Soviet Union, 1941; Panzer Maneuver War in the North African Desert, 1941-1942; and Panzer Maneuver War in the Forests and Lakes of the Baltic, 1941. The acknowledged superiority of the German Army in battle fighting is exemplified by the offensives of 1939-1942. This book combines description and interpretation of the advances of nine German panzer divisions to reveal extraordinary details of the great victories. Based on primary source material, the book presents an authoritative and original interpretation of German success, and not the familiar synthesis of secondary sources. Russell H. S. Stolfi (1932-2012) was a Naval Postgraduate School professor emeritus and a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. He received a bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1954, then served as an officer in the Marine Corps until 1963, when he transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve. He then returned to Stanford, earned a master's degree in modern European history in 1964, and finally earned his Ph.D. in modern European history in 1966. After graduating, he joined the Naval Postgraduate School's Department of National Security Affairs, where he remained for the remainder of his academic career. During his time at NPS, he returned to active duty in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1967, 1973-1974, and 1990. Derived from a review posted on line by Professor Lee Baker, University of Cincinnati. This book asks a key, foundational question: what factors contributed to the outstanding early success of German mobile operations? Professor Stolfi searches for the answer by first dividing this book into three parts based upon terrain: the Ukraine and the Minsk-Moscow axis during the summer and early fall of 1941 (basically neutral terrain for tanks); North Africa at the beginning of the campaign by the Afrika Corps in 1941-42 (ideal tank country); and the heavily forested wetlands of the Baltic region during the initial weeks of "Operation Barbarossa" (difficult, if not impossible, for traditional tank warfare). He then examines the war diaries of the panzer and mobile divisions which operated in these areas to determine how they managed to quickly accomplish their missions despite the unfavorable ground and a formidable enemy. His goal is to discover the operational lessons which can be applied to modern tank operations. The primary lesson which Professor Stolfi derives is that German mobile units managed to adroitly blend a certain style and organization. The stylistic elements include the well-known tendency of successful German commanders to lead the main effort from the front while delegating effective command of the division to the operations officer, usually a Major. This allowed for the flexible exploitation of opportunities as they arose and was a vital factor in keeping the divisions moving forward. The second component is the organization which the Germans used to accomplish their missions. Most operations were accomplished after the divisions had been broken up into battle groups of combined arms which were often led by relatively junior officers. The divisional commander accompanied the battle group whose mission formed the main effort but he could easily switch to another should circumstances require a change in plans. Each group had a simple yet ambitious mission, and each was expected to maintain the tempo necessary to achieve its goals. One of the major factors which allowed the battle groups to maintain their tempo and achieve their missions was the small number of officers in a German division. This meant the commanders could concentrate on fighting rather than dealing with the bureaucracy inherent in a large hierarchical organization (there were, for example, eleven officers in a German panzer division while there are thirty-nine in a modern U.S. Marine armored division). German commanders were therefore in touch with the fluid battle conditions and were able to make effective decisions based upon current information because they were not insulated from the field by subordinate officers who function, in essence, as information filters. Each of the three parts yields the same essential points, which reinforces Professor Stolfi's thesis. This book is an important contribution to our understanding of what made the German Panzers so effective because it is the only place where all the threads have been woven together. Anyone interested in seeing exactly how the armored units worked as combat units or in improving the performance of modern tank operations would profit by this book, as would generalists who are interested in German tank operations during World War II.