Seeds of Terror Open ebook - 2004

Excerpt

Chapter 9: Bali: Al-Qaeda's Plan B

On October 12, 2002, al-Qaeda pulled off its second-worst attack after 9/11, at the Sari Club in Bali, Indonesia, killing more than two hundred people. Ironically, it was a Plan B for the terrorists, who had been forced to abandon bigger plans for multiple bombings in Singapore. The full story of the Bali bombing has never been told. Thanks to a lengthy confession by one of its early planners, an al-Qaeda operative codenamed "Sammy" -- until now, kept secret by authorities -- a remarkable window has opened not simply into the Bali plot, but much deeper -- into the entire training, organization, and planning of al-Qaeda both before and after 9/11.

Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a young Canadian of Iraqi descent, is a reed-thin, tall boy with a moustache who moved to Canada from Kuwait on August 16, 1994, but continued to maintain an Iraqi passport. At the time he was twelve years old, with three brothers: the eldest, fifteen-year-old Abdullah, thirteen-year-old Abdul Rahman, and the youngest, Yussef. Mohammed would not be the only brother to join al-Qaeda; Abdul Rahman, just a year older, would actually go to the training camps in Afghanistan first -- less than a month before Mohammed did, in July 2000. (Eventually Abdul Rahman would hit the radar screen of law enforcement agencies around the world, implicated in the Saudi Arabia bombings of Western housing compounds in Riyadh on May 12, 2003.)

Although the two middle brothers would turn to al-Qaeda, eldest brother Abdullah would not. He is considered the black sheep of the family, corrupted by Western values. When a student at university, Abdullah did not get the chance to say good-bye to his brothers when they left for Afghanistan, because he was ostracized for choosing to live with his girlfriend. Today, he freely admits that he likes his alcohol and is surrounded by many women. Rakish and relaxed, he and his friends often smoke pot in the garage of his family home in Canada.

"They made their choices," said Abdullah Jabarah, "I made mine." He ended up with the women, "and they got to pray at the mosque." He said maybe they couldn't adjust to Canada, although "you'd think I would be the one with the hard time adjusting being the oldest. I was fifteen." Now because it's widely known that his two brothers are international terrorists, he is thinking of changing his family name. "They didn't think about me and the impact it would have on me and my parents," he said, refusing to speak specifically about each brother except that "between Abdul Rahman and Mohammed, Mohammed is a crazy bastard. Fucking mad."

It is through Mohammed Jabarah that we get the clearest sense of how al-Qaeda's University of Terror works -- partly because he is young. He has an impressionable mind and a great memory, and he is cooperating with authorities. Through him, you see -- much like in large university campuses -- how classmates meet each other, how they identify faces by whom they hang out with and what class they graduated with, how getting their first assignments is much like getting a first job, and how the alumni network remains ready to be activated for future attacks. To his interrogators at the Federal Bureau of Immigration and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, he provided one of the most comprehensive portraits of al-Qaeda's manipulative recruitment process, training, and deployment.

Reading Mohammed's files, I get a glimmer of understanding of al-Qaeda's appeal and how it works on young minds, reminding me of my college years at Princeton. For someone who grew up by the boardwalk in Seaside Heights, New Jersey, I spent high school blissfully unaware of many things, including what JAP meant. Middle class and Asian, I thought -- a shortened version of Japanese, maybe? Then I went to Princeton and learned about a world I could never have conceptualized -- where everyone knows JAP means "Jewish American princess." Princeton introduced me to a whole new socioeconomic hierarchy that didn't exist for the people I grew up with off Exit 88 of the Garden State Parkway.

Princeton changed and molded me. It taught me an entire worldview: ideals, methods of analysis, frames of references, modes of attacking and solving problems. Socially, I saw the difference in the way people dressed, the way they walked, the way they spoke. It changed the way I dressed, the way I walked, the way I spoke. Going there opened my eyes, empowered me, made me realize one person working with like-minded individuals can change the world. Princeton made me want to change the world.

Above all, there was the Honor Code, which each Princetonian writes on every single term paper, every single exam: one single sentence that says you have not cheated and promise to turn in anyone who does -- a strict, idealistic way of making university students behave. Leave the students alone in a room, hand out test papers, and put them on their honor. It's brilliant in part because it uses peer pressure. Even if you tried to cheat, can you be sure everyone in the room will cheat with you by not turning you in? Even worse, are you willing to compromise not just your honor but everyone else's? You're part of a tradition that dates back hundreds of years, and you can't let the institution, your friends, and your family down. It's wonderful in its simplicity, and even during my last exams my senior year, it was always with a feeling of pride that I wrote that sentence and signed my name: "I pledge on my honor that I have not violated the principles of the Honor Code." With me, it left behind the idea that honor means something important, that it is something we all must aspire to -- and that not everyone makes it.

That feeling of exclusivity, of self-discipline, of being part of an elite who see a vision for a better world, of a tradition for excellence you must maintain: all that is exactly what al-Qaeda creates in its global network: from the schools known as pesantrens and madrassas, which begin to train young minds of four or five year olds, to the training camps hidden around the world, to the terrorist cells that carry out its plots. Certainly, al-Qaeda members want to change the world. Young Muslim men dream of joining al-Qaeda, of being trained to think and act like al-Qaeda, of standing up to oppression. Malaysia's prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, understands the appeal: "The reason why Osama Bin Laden has been able to recruit people to his movement is because there is a lot of disillusionment on the part of Muslims because their governments seem to be pussy-footing and not doing anything to defend the Muslims, to stop this oppression of Muslims, the massacre of Muslims, the attack against so many Muslim countries."

Al-Qaeda has been compared to a corporation that franchises terrorism, but it operates at a far deeper level than that by molding young minds at extremely formative stages and providing an ideological cause that includes something Princeton never demanded from its students: self-sacrifice for a greater cause and a guaranteed place in heaven. Instead of an Honor Code, al-Qaeda demanded the ba'yat -- the oath of loyalty.

It gives scholarships for students who can't afford to attend, and it creates fellowships and grants for other like-minded groups that have special projects they need help with. "Any group who has the ability and the people will send a representative to Afghanistan to meet Osama Bin Laden and pitch a plan for Osama Bin Laden to support," describes an FBI document. In the process, it co-opts those groups into its global agenda -- like the Jemaah Islamiyah cell that pulled off the Bali bombing.

Mohammed Mansour Jabarah's recruitment began during his high school summers, in the Middle East. After the family moved to Canada in 1994, both brothers returned to Kuwait during their summer vacations. While there, Mohammed often visited his Islamic teacher, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, a plump, full-bearded man with a white turban who later, after the September 11 attacks, became al-Qaeda's spokesman, saying things like, "The Americans must know that the storm of Airplanes will not stop, God willing, and there are thousands of young people who are as keen about death as Americans are about life." Back in the mid-1990s, he was doing his part to find young recruits, paying more attention to the Jabarah brothers as they grew older, in particular, fanning young Mohammed's anger by showing him training videos from what he called "the jihad in Bosnia" and videotaped speeches of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor. In 1999, Mohammed fastened on the violence in Chechnya, surfing websites and poring over videotapes of the fighting there, most propaganda tapes created by al-Qaeda and given to him by Abu Ghaith. When he returned to Canada after that summer, age sixteen, Mohammed raised money from friends and neighbors on at least three occasions and transferred more than $3,500 to Abu Ghaith.

The next summer in July 2000, Mohammed's brother Abdul Rahman left for Afghanistan. About a month later, Mohammed met Abu Ghaith in Kuwait, who then paid the younger Jabarah's fare to Karachi, Pakistan. Using a series of guides, Mohammed went from Karachi to Peshawar and then on to a five-hour hike through the mountains to wind up at the town of Torkham, on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There the two brothers met and waited about a week. Since the camp wasn't ready yet, they joined a group of eighteen men at the Sheik Shaheed Abu Yahya training camp, about 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) north of Kabul, Afghanistan. This was Tahziri, meaning the "beginning" or the "preparation" -- the first course for every Muslim student who wants to go on a jihad. Weapons training included handling antitank and antiaircraft weapons like the Sam-7 and stinger missiles. The brothers were taught how to set explosives and use grenades and mines. The course had a bonus: a two-week program on topography and navigation.

The days were long and grueling. Trainees woke up before sunrise to pray, followed by two hours of physical training: one hour of jogging and an hour of calisthenics. After that, they showered and had breakfast. Then they were divided into training groups for classroom work, which lasted about an hour, before a ten-minute break. They came back to class for another hour, after which they could take a forty-five-minute nap. They woke up for noon prayers, followed by an hour's lecture on the Koran. Then it was time for lunch, after which each group did its assigned chores for the maintenance of the camp until afternoon prayers. The rest of the afternoon was spent on "practical military training" -- weapons training, live fire exercises, and explosives training. After dinner came a lecture on the virtues of jihad and its finer points, which lasted until around 8:00 to 8:30 P.M., the time for evening prayers. Only after that could they rest, but even sleep was interrupted by shifts on guard duty for the camp. It was and is a rigorous schedule that instills discipline and the ideology of radical Islam in an environment of brotherly camaraderie. The course lasts for sixty continuous days, during which students are given an entire philosophy of living life and are challenged mentally, spiritually, and physically.

After trainees finished the introductory course, at least in 2000 and 2001, they were given a choice: volunteer and fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, go through more training, or return home. The American students arrested in Lackawanna, New York, for example, had decided to go back home. The Jabarah brothers chose to get more training, open to only the "top-rated candidates on the Basic course" in urban guerrilla warfare. Lasting two and a half months, the course teaches students how to organize cells and gives them advanced weapons training and physical combat techniques, as well as honing their analysis of the risks involved in attacking a building. When Mohammed and Abdul Rahman finished this course, they decided it was time to try out their newly acquired skills by fighting with the Taliban.

Mohammed spent two weeks at the front before returning to Kabul for a course on the Koran, but in early 2001, he was diagnosed with hepatitis by al-Qaeda's second in command, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and was bedridden for about a month. That January, his brother left Afghanistan to see their parents in Canada and then attend the hajj in Saudi Arabia. He returned to Canada in the spring of 2001.

By that time, Mohammed was taking another advanced course with about forty men -- the guerrilla mountain warfare course, lasting another two and a half months. Recruits were taught theories of guerrilla warfare, ambush, and communications skills. The training took place at the Al-Farouq training camp, about 75 kilometers from Kandahar. Mohammed noticed several "white guys" -- Westerners -- taking his course: two blond Australians about twenty-five and thirty years old, a black twenty-year-old Brit named Abbas, a thirty-year-old Jamaican named Khalid, and a black Frenchman. These recruits, like the Jabarah brothers, were becoming increasingly valuable to al-Qaeda because they defied the expectations and profiles of international law enforcement agencies.

After he finished this course, Mohammed returned to Kandahar and stayed at a guesthouse next to the Arabic Islamic Institute. His brother Abdul Rahman returned to Afghanistan, staying with Mohammed briefly at the guest house. Around the end of June 2001, Abu Ghaith came to visit Mohammed and "popped the question": Did he want to become a member of al-Qaeda? Abu Ghaith told him "this decision could only be made by him but that it might be a good idea to join." It was much like becoming a "made man" in the mafia. Only the best recruits were invited.

At that point, Mohammed had already met twice with Osama bin Laden. (He would meet him two more times.) It had taken some doing. The first meeting Mohammed arranged through personal connections, finagling to get close to bin Laden's secretary, a Yemeni named Bashir. Most of their conversation that first time centered on developments in Kuwait. The second meeting happened just a short while before Abu Ghaith recommended Mohammed join al-Qaeda. At the end of Mohammed's mountain warfare course, Abu Ghaith and Osama bin Laden came to the camp "to congratulate the course graduates." Abu Ghaith asked the graduates to support Osama bin Laden, who then gave a graduation speech and attempted to rally new recruits by telling them "hits" would be coming soon against the United States, " 'hits' severe enough to make the United States forget about Vietnam." It was just two months before 9/11. Mohammed, who had originally wanted to get training so he could fight the jihad in Chechnya or in the Middle East, began to rethink his plans. When he heard bin Laden speak that June, he was tempted to join al-Qaeda and focus on a broader set of enemies.

It was a momentous decision, and Mohammed did not make it quickly. In July, Abu Ghaith visited him in the guest house in Kandahar and talked further about it. In mid-July, Mohammed took an additional one-week advanced course for snipers at the al-Qaeda camp at the Kandahar airport. Jabarah excelled at the course, placing first at the competition held at its conclusion. After that, Osama bin Laden invited Mohammed and the other trainees to his house in Kandahar. In their third meeting, Mohammed watched as bin Laden showed videotapes from the Arabic network Al-Jazeera, which conducted a poll that showed Osama bin Laden was more popular than the United States. Bin Laden looked proud while he was screening the tape.

By that point, both Abu Ghaith and Mohammed had been selected to take part in an elite course for potential bodyguards for bin Laden. The fact they were asked to attend the course is considered a great honor among the Muslim fighters in the camps. The course teaches precision shooting with limited ammunition and tests and hones the student's reaction times. Both men took the course, but neither got the job. Mohammed was offered a spot as a trainer at the Al-Farouq camp, but he turned it down because "he wanted to fight, not train."

Not everyone who attended al-Qaeda's camps became a member. The camps were part of a weeding-out process, and only the best of the best were invited to join. Mohammed estimated al-Qaeda had about 3,000 to 4,000 members, of whom perhaps 300 to 400 were leaders, each handling up to six cell members. As a student, Mohammed spent much time reading books about his passion (jihad and al-Qaeda), asking questions, identifying who did what and who was calling the shots, what happened when -- trying to piece together the history of the organization. He devoured its folklore, the gossip about the men, and their dealings and sometimes double-dealings around the camps.

Al-Qaeda was constantly vigilant and paranoid about double agents and had a continuous screening process. During the time Mohammed was there, several people were being interrogated on suspicions they were spies: an Omani, an Afghan, three Kurds, and a Jordanian. After one particularly grueling interrogation session, the Jordanian committed suicide. It is little wonder that intelligence agencies have struggled to infiltrate bin Laden's organization.

Al-Qaeda's Afghan camp was a perfect jihad university, complete with student dorms, a guest house, a media house to get information out, and its training camps. Mohammed met several second-generation al-Qaeda members: Asad, one of the sons of blind Egyptian sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, and three of Osama bin Laden's sons, including Saad, rumored to be in training to follow in his father's footsteps. Saad took the mountain warfare training course with Mohammed, who asked the younger bin Laden many questions about common acquaintances. Through Saad, Mohammed learned a man he met at a Libyan guest house in Kabul was Anas al-Liby, who was teaching courses on "surveillance, interception and internal security." A member of al-Qaeda from the days it was based in Sudan, he had one other special task. Because he was tall and bore a resemblance to bin Laden, Saad told Mohammed that Anas al-Liby was sometimes used as a decoy when bin Laden was traveling.

At the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, Mohammed ran twice into a wild-haired man he was told was a member of al-Qaeda. Known as Abd al-Jabbar, he was good friends with a black al-Qaeda member Mohammed knew as Sawari. Much later, Mohammed would find out Abd al-Jabbar was actually Richard Reid, the shoe bomber who tried to ignite explosives while on a transatlantic flight, and that his friend Sawari was none other than Zacarias Moussaoui, linked to the JI cell in Southeast Asia, now on trial in the United States for September 11-related charges.

Mohammed also met four of the September 11 hijackers in a guest house in Kandahar around March 2001. What impressed him most was that one of the men, Ahmed al-Haznawi, "was very devout and could recite the entire Koran from memory." Al-Haznawi would hijack Flight 93, the plane that crash-landed in Pennsylvania. Mohammed said he was later told by an al-Qaeda member who trained with the hijackers that the plane was headed for the White House. (One of the 9/11 planners, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, however, told authorities it was headed for Capitol Hill.)

Another hijacker was Abdulaziz Alomari, who would be on the plane that crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center; the others were Khalid al-Midhar and Salem al-Hazmi, who would be on Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon. Al-Haznawi and Alomari gave motivational speeches in Kandahar, while al-Hazmi often rode a motorcycle around town. In a sign of how al-Qaeda maintains security, Mohammed knew these men under their aliases and didn't find out their real names until after he saw their pictures on the news.

Mohammed learned more details about the planning for 9/11 from an al-Qaeda operative named Ahmed Sahagi, a twenty-five-year-old Saudi national and former bodyguard of Osama bin Laden, later assigned to work with Mohammed. Sahagi told Mohammed he attended an "operational training course" with about twenty to thirty people, a group trained for two years to carry out the September 11 attacks. Ahmed said no one knew exactly what they were training for, only that it was an operation in the United States and that the training included hand-to-hand combat. To show how small and interconnected al-Qaeda's operations were, one of their two trainers, Egyptian Hamza Zubair, taught Mohammed his mountain warfare course.

Two of the hijackers as well as Moussaoui subsequently stayed in an apartment in Malaysia owned by Hambali's deputy, Yazid Sufaat. The key link of the Southeast Asian JI cell to the September 11 hijackers was Mohammed's agent-handler, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, KSM.

Mohammed pieced together much of the history and interpersonal connections of the men who ran al-Qaeda. For example, Mohammed asked about Ramzi Yousef and found out from one of al-Qaeda's top leaders that KSM was "very close to Ramzi Yousef and a person named Azmurai" who was described by KSM as "extremely tough and brave." Osama Azmurai -- spelled by Philippine authorities as "Osmurai" in intelligence documents -- was the pseudonym used by Afghan Wali Khan Amin Shah, one of the operatives from the al-Qaeda cell busted in Manila in 1995. Mohammed said KSM told him that "Yousef and Azmarai were good with explosives, and they were both arrested by the US." KSM admitted he "was in Asia with Yousef and Azmarai during a plot to bomb airliners."

Yousef left another legacy: Mohammed told his interrogators that students at the Darunta camp in Afghanistan were taught how to deal with explosives, poisons, and electronics, including how to use a Casio watch as a timer for a bomb -- the technique created and perfected by Ramzi Yousef to avoid airport security, which he used effectively on a Philippine Airlines plane in 1994. Years after he was arrested and imprisoned, Yousef's terrorist tricks were still being taught in al-Qaeda's university of terror.

Mohammed knew KSM's brother, Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, who worked with Islamic charities in Peshawar. Mohammed also said he often saw KSM and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf together and that they were good friends. Again, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was another link between the dozens of JI leaders in Southeast Asia, including Abu Sayyaf founder Abdurajak Janjalani and most of the JI leaders from Indonesia, who were trained in Afghanistan under Sayyaf's tutelage and patronage. Although Sayyaf has never been labeled a member of al-Qaeda, these personal links are clear. In fact, two days before the 9/11 attacks, it was his connections as a part of the Northern Alliance that assisted two Arabs pretending to be journalists to cut through the security of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud and successfully assassinate the sole moderate leader who had long fought the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Sayyaf is still dogged by suspicions he helped assassinate Massoud, with the support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, a charge Sayyaf has consistently denied.

These were the events that interested Mohammed, and he asked questions of nearly everyone he came into contact with -- like one of his first trainers, Abu Omar, who was in Sudan with Osama bin Laden, and helped explain al-Qaeda's early years. After the Soviet occupation ended, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, where he continued to try to refine the global connections they had formed. When Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saudi Arabia needed help, bin Laden offered the support of his "Afghan Arabs." Yet instead of relying on Muslims, the Saudis turned to the Americans. After the Gulf War, bin Laden was furious at the continued presence of American troops. He asked Muslim scholars to issue a fatwah, but they were afraid, and he felt marginalized. Eventually, he left Saudi Arabia and settled in the Sudan. That was when Mohammed believed bin Laden started actively targeting America and crafting his plan for a global jihad. Bin Laden began urging Muslims not just to concentrate on their own domestic problems with individual governments, stating, "Like an octopus with many arms, hitting the arms is not productive. The only effective way to kill the octopus is to attack its head" -- which bin Laden identified as the United States.

Mohammed heard talk about early operations and the lessons they taught: like al-Qaeda's failed assassination plots against U.S. president Bill Clinton, Philippine president Fidel Ramos, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak -- all of which helped create a special course on assassination techniques taught to advanced members. Another operation that was dissected in front of Mohammed was the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Mohammed had met an al-Qaeda member named Osama al Kini in one of the guest houses in Kandahar. Later, he was told al Kini had taught the truck driver in the Nairobi bombing, a Saudi named Azzam, how to drive. Abdullah Azzam drove the truck in the actual operation, but something went wrong because there were supposed to be two "martyrs." Later, bin Laden himself would tell Mohammed in a one-on-one meeting that the other bomber was supposed to be Mohammed Rashed al-'Owhali, who was also riding in the truck. "He was supposed to fight with a guard and open the gate and have Azzam drive into the compound," bin Laden said. Al-'Owhali forgot his pistol inside the truck, and when he realized the bomb was going to explode away from its target, he ran. Later, Mohammed said he heard the "guy who did not die was arrested by the U.S." as, in fact, happened on August 12, 1998.

Mohammed learned al-Qaeda was run by a "Shura Council" -- a leadership council that has been replicated by al-Qaeda-linked groups like Jemaah Islamiyah. While Mohammed was in the training camps, al-Qaeda's Shura Council was made up of Osama bin Laden; his deputy, the Egyptian Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri; Saif al-Adel, in charge of the security committee; Mohammed Atef, head of the military committee; Abu Mohammed al-Masri; Sheikh Sayid and Abu Hafs al-Mauritania, both in charge of religious teaching; and KSM, who ran the Media House. After the death of Atef, KSM would become the head of the military committee.

There were internal problems, as there are in all organizations. Mohammed learned about rivalry within al-Qaeda. "The Egyptians were the ones who started al-Qaeda with Osama bin Laden, and Osama bin Laden was extremely loyal to them....Many were jealous of the Egyptians' important and expanding role in al-Qaeda," Mohammed told the FBI. He told stories of bin Laden's loyalty: how in 1998 when bin Laden heard criticism against his military chief, Atef (a.k.a. Abu Hafs), he called operatives together and began speaking about the Prophet Mohammed, explaining that the only person who stayed with the Prophet during the most challenging times was Abu Bakr. Bin Laden then went on to compare Abu Hafs to Abu Bakr. "Abu Hafs [Atef] knew of Jihad," said bin Laden, "before most of you were even born." Atef began to cry, Mohammed said. Then bin Laden told his fighters he no longer wanted to hear "negative talk about Abu Hafs." Abu Hafs was an Egyptian military commander.

Mohammed learned that after 9/11, the camp where he took the guerrilla mountain warfare course was completely destroyed, but he was also told that al-Qaeda had evacuated all its people by the time the U.S. air strikes began less than a month after 9/11. Mohammed told his interrogators that al-Qaeda had planned to reorganize after the airstrikes in Afghanistan. "The plan was for al-Qaeda people to stay in Afghanistan," Mohammed said, "go to Tajikistan, Iran or Pakistan to regroup, or to return to their home countries and wait for a call."

Mohammed's own terrorism work and the roots of the Bali plot began shortly after he finished his last course -- about the time al-Qaeda was putting together the last touches of 9/11. In July 2001, Mohammed asked for a private meeting with bin Laden.

"I want to join al-Qaeda," Mohammed told bin Laden.

"Well. What courses did you take, and how did you do in them?" bin Laden asked. Mohammed reviewed his record, noting that he ranked first in competitions like the one for his sniper course. "You've done well," said bin Laden. "It's an impressive record."

"But I bring more advantages for al-Qaeda," Mohammed said. "I speak excellent English, and I have a clean Canadian passport. I can travel anywhere, and merge into Western cities better than others who work for you."

"But are you ready to fight the enemies of Allah wherever they are? Are you ready to strike fear into the heart of infidels? Can you declare war on Americans and Jews everywhere?"

"Yes."

"Are you ready to swear a bay'at to me?"

"Yes," he told bin Laden.

Immediately, he swore the oath.

As they finished, bin Laden said, "By God's will, the coming hits will change all the borders, and all the borders will be redrawn."

Then he told Mohammed to go meet with "Mohammed the Pakistani" for instructions and money for an operation. Mohammed had graduated and was being sent to none other than KSM.

In the first week of August 2001, Mohammed traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, to meet his agent-handler. Mohammed checked into the Embassy Hotel and called KSM, who came to the hotel and picked him up. They drove to KSM's Karachi apartment. KSM had been expecting him and immediately asked about his English-speaking skills. When they got to the apartment, there was another al-Qaeda agent already there, introduced to him as Ahmed.

Ahmed seemed to be about twenty-five or twenty-six years old. He carried a Saudi passport and spoke with a Saudi accent. Ahmed said he was married and had three children, and his family was with him in Afghanistan. From the way he behaved, Mohammed deduced that Ahmed grew up in wealthy surroundings. A veteran al-Qaeda member, Ahmed Sahagi would become Mohammed's partner, but at that point, no explanation was given for his presence. The two men lived with KSM in his Karachi apartment for three weeks. During that time, KSM taught them "how to travel on trains and buses, how to book travel tickets, and how to conform to local customs when traveling."

"When you first travel to a city, on the immigration form -- the arrival documents, list a five-star hotel. When you get there, spend only one night at this hotel, then switch to a cheaper one," KSM told them. "You can use a telephone book to find your second hotel, and you should walk outside, and call from a public telephone to make your reservations. Also, when you leave that five-star hotel, make sure you don't take a taxi so there is no record of your trip."

"In fact," KSM added, "use mass transit -- buses and trains -- particularly when crossing borders. Security is not as vigilant as in airports. But you should never take taxis from your hotel because what we've found is that taxi drivers are often working for intelligence services. Avoid areas like mosques and Islamic centers -- the places authorities would be watching looking for people like us. We must break the stereotypes they have.

"When you get to your next hotel, get a tourist guide book. It will have information on how to get around, and it will list potential targets. The guide book will have the addresses of the United States and Israeli embassies, which you should note down as target potentials. Take down the addresses of the American and Israeli airlines in that city." They too were potential targets for terrorist attacks.

KSM explained how to contact other cell members: "The safest way possible. Try not to use cell phones. Public phones are safer. Once you're in place, find a business center in a hotel or Internet café. You contact the other members of the group by e-mail and wait for a response. Use the code words for whatever cell you're working with, but after that first contact, arrange to have your meetings in public places, like shopping malls. Be careful to understand and merge with local customs. Look at how others dress, whether they wear a beard or not, and imitate what they are doing. Above all, don't call attention to yourselves."

After about three weeks, within days of 9/11, KSM told Mohammed to get ready to go to Malaysia to meet with local members "who were planning an operation against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in the Philippines."29 Mohammed would "be the go-between for the local Southeast Asian operatives and al-Qaeda," and his "job would be to provide money for a suicide operation in the Philippines."

"Work with them," KSM told Mohammed. "If they need anything, especially money, advise me, and I'll make sure you get what they ask for."

Before leaving Pakistan, KSM brought Mohammed to Hambali's apartment in Karachi. It was time for the two to meet. Mohammed had seen Hambali once before at the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, and he also remembered seeing Hambali driving a white Toyota Corolla. He knew Hambali was a senior member of the group operating in Asia. At his apartment, Hambali began giving him more details about the planned operations. He told Mohammed he would meet with three men -- Mahmoud, Azzam, and Saad -- and he gave him a phone number to call once he arrived in Kuala Lumpur. The three men would turn out to be Hambali's deputy for Mantiqi 1: Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (Mahmoud); Jemaah Islamiyah's finance chief, Zulkifli Marzuki (Azzam); and Indonesian Fathur Roman al-Ghozi (Saad), in charge of the actual bombing operations.

One day after that meeting, KSM told Mohammed to make sure he left Pakistan by Tuesday, September 11. Given the secrecy shrouding much of the al-Qaeda leaders' movements and the repeated messages from bin Laden warning of more attacks, Mohammed deduced that something big would happen on 9/11. KSM and Mohammed bought a ticket on a plane leaving Karachi for Hong Kong and on to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, after the layover. KSM told Mohammed someone else would join him in Kuala Lumpur and that more details would be e-mailed to him after his arrival. The e-mail address used by Mohammed and KSM was silver_crack2002@yahoo.com using the password "hotmail." Both men knew the password so both could access it. Mohammed set up another e-mail account for communication with Hambali: Honda_civic12 @yahoo.com with the password "frfoosh." After these details were worked out, KSM and Mohammed went to a bank in Karachi and withdrew $40,000. He gave Mohammed $10,000 for his expenses.

Mohammed arrived in Hong Kong in time to watch the airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center. He suspected KSM was behind the attacks, and he was right. (KSM, in his apartment in Pakistan, had several video machines set to record the coverage in anticipation of the attacks.) Mohammed was simultaneously elated and daunted, but he went on to his designated meeting point in Malaysia. When he landed at the capital, Mohammed went to a hotel in the Masjid India section of the city, which is where Hambali told him to stay.

When he opened his e-mail at an Internet café, he found a message from KSM telling him his "friend" was already there. Confused, Mohammed sent back a reply asking KSM whom he was referring to, but before he could receive a response, he thought it might be the Ahmed he had just spent three weeks with. Curious, Mohammed checked nearby hotels and found Ahmed Sahagi, now designated a suicide bomber in the operation. Ahmed had just arrived from Pakistan and told Mohammed the 9/11 attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda; indeed, he was with KSM when the attacks actually happened. KSM was at first disappointed, but soon turned happy when the buildings finally "came down."

After a week together, Mohammed called Zulkifli Marzuki and set a time to meet. Zulkifli was about thirty-five years old and owned a home security outfit, where the meeting was held. Mohammed asked about Faiz, who was on a business trip, and al-Ghozi, who "was in the mountains training with the rebels."

"I'm here to help you," Mohammed told Zulkifli. "If you need anything, let me know."

"Thank you. We're glad you're here. We'll meet with Faiz as soon as he returns," said Zulkifli.

After another week, the meeting was set -- this time at a McDonald's in Kuala Lumpur.

"I received the $10,000," Faiz said, leaving Mohammed to surmise its source. "How is Mukhtar [KSM] doing?"

KSM had told Mohammed money had already been sent to their local members. It was obvious that Faiz knew KSM personally and the $10,000 must have come from him.

"In order to get this operation going," Faiz continued, "we need to get in touch with Saad [Fathur Roman al-Ghozi] because he is the one who will find the explosives. May Allah protect him." Faiz then told Mohammed and Ahmed to go to the Philippines to meet with al-Ghozi. "I'll ask him to e-mail you after you arrive in Manila."

At the beginning of October 2001, Mohammed and Ahmed traveled to Manila and checked in at the Horizon Hotel. Overlooking Manila Bay, it sits at a key juncture between Manila and the financial capital, Makati. After a few days, Mohammed received an e-mail from al-Ghozi giving a phone number for Mohammed to call. Within two days, al-Ghozi, acting like a tourist, came to the hotel to meet the two al-Qaeda operatives. Mohammed said al-Ghozi spoke fluent Arabic, and he noted al-Ghozi's al-Qaeda training in explosives.

"I have three hundred kilograms of TNT," said al-Ghozi. "I need a little more time and money before I can figure out exactly how much we need. I know I want at least four tons of explosives."

Al-Ghozi took Mohammed and Ahmed to see the potential targets: the U.S. embassy on Roxas Boulevard in Manila and the Israeli embassy in Makati. "We have a problem with the U.S. embassy," al-Ghozi explained. "It's not a good target. It's set back too far from the road so a truck bomb wouldn't be enough. Maybe we could get a plane to crash into the building. In order to make sure we succeed, we would need at least two operations, but even then I'm still not sure it would be successful. Can we go to Malaysia" -- the leadership base -- "and talk about what this means?"

Ten days later, Mohammed and Ahmed returned to Kuala Lumpur. Separately, al-Ghozi traveled to the Malaysian capital. Again through e-mail, Zulkifli arranged for a meeting between the plotters. They met at McDonald's at the Pertama Complex mall and then drove around in a van. Using a combination of Arabic, English, and Malay, al-Ghozi explained that the Philippine targets "were not good." Faiz suggested an alternative plan, asking Mohammed and al-Ghozi to travel to Singapore "to videotape targets."

Mohammed and al-Ghozi left Kuala Lumpur and made their way to Singapore separately. Ahmed stayed behind. Mohammed boarded a bus two days after the meeting, and when he arrived in front of the Royale Hotel, al-Ghozi met him there with three Singaporean JI cell members using the pseudonyms Simpson, Max, and Alex. The arrival of the al-Qaeda operative the Singaporeans knew as "Sammy" and the Indonesian known as "Mike the bomb-maker" activated Jemaah Islamiyah's sleeper cell in Singapore. Targets were videotaped and, later in Kuala Lumpur, the leaders of the plot chose seven targets: "the American Embassy, the British Embassy, the British Consulate, the Israeli Embassy, The American Club, the Bank of America and the U.S. Naval Ship Yards." Al-Ghozi estimated they would need an additional 17 tons of explosives, costing approximately $160,000. Al-Ghozi returned to Manila to try to find a source for the explosives.

In the meantime, Mohammed returned to Malaysia where, to save money, he and Ahmed rented an apartment in November. Faiz had told him Malaysia "was their economic base" and so should not be considered a target. Then Mohammed called KSM to ask for money, but his home phone was answered by KSM's secretary, who told him KSM had returned to Afghanistan. Mohammed asked for $50,000 for the Singapore operation. After a week, he received an e-mail telling him to call a phone number in Malaysia and tell the person who answered that he "was from the side of Iqbal." The phone number in Malaysia was answered by a man named Yousef, who met with Mohammed at City One Plaza on November 7, 2001. Yousef came in traditional Afghan tunic and pants, and Mohammed thought he looked Pakistani and was worried because he seemed unconcerned about security. Mohammed said he believed Yousef was al-Qaeda's money man in Malaysia. Yousef said he had received $30,000 for Mohammed. At the mall that day, he gave $10,000 to Mohammed. Two days later, they met again and exchanged another $10,000, followed a couple of days later by another exchange of the final $10,000. Each time, the money was handed to Mohammed in an envelope: $100 bills tied by a rubber band. Mohammed received the money the Jemaah Islamiyah asked for and immediately contacted Zulkifli and handed him the money.

The plan "was to smuggle explosives from the Philippines by ship to Indonesia and then from Indonesia to Singapore for the operation," but this could take up to a year and a half if they were to do it safely. In short, Plan A, as devised by KSM well in advance of 9/11, at least in general terms, would not have come to pass until roughly spring 2003, if it had stayed on track. But then came Plan B.

Sometime in mid-December, Hambali returned to Kuala Lumpur from Afghanistan with news that Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda's military chief, had been killed in the U.S. airstrikes. Furthermore, two days before his death, Atef had told Hambali to push the timetable forward for the Asian attacks. If the explosives are in the Philippines, he said, then attack targets there. Hambali told Mohammed to contact al-Ghozi and "cancel the Singapore operation and pick targets in the Philippines."

"If the U.S. and Israeli embassies are not good targets," Hambali said, "then pick better ones, but let's do this in the Philippines."

A week later, Mohammed opened his in box to find an e-mail from Zulkifli titled "problem." Hambali's deputy, Faiz, had been arrested in Singapore while he was visiting his mother. The Singapore plans, already abandoned, would very likely have been compromised anyway. Zulkifli told Mohammed to get out of Malaysia and flee to Bangkok.

The crackdown had begun in Singapore and Malaysia. The word among the operatives in the area was get to Thailand as quickly as possible. Mohammed and Ahmed were among the first to do so. After about two weeks, Mohammed received another e-mail from Zulkifli giving him a phone number to call in Bangkok. When Mohammed called, he found himself speaking with Hambali. When they met at the Chaleena Hotel in Bangkok the next morning, Hambali told Mohammed to leave Southeast Asia "before his picture showed up in the news."

The last time Mohammed saw Hambali was in mid-January 2002, in southern Thailand: "At that time, Hambali discussed carrying out attacks with his group. His plan was to conduct small bombings in bars, cafés or nightclubs frequented by Westerners in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia. Hambali also stated that he had one ton of PETN explosive in Indonesia." It was a switch to so-called soft targets.

Mohammed Jabarah was arrested in March 2002, part of the post-9/11 crackdown. The Bali plot went forward without him.

Thanks to Indonesian police work in the wake of the Bali bombing, the rest of the story can now be told in considerable detail. Before fleeing to Thailand, Hambali had had a meeting with the leaders of Mantiqi 1 in Johor Bahru. Covering Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand, Mantiqi 1 was the most ambitious of Jemaah Islamiyah's cells in terms of terror plots. Jemaah Islamiyah developed plans on its own, and when Hambali felt his team was ready, he asked al-Qaeda for help, as he had done for Jabarah. Four days after the arrest of Faiz, Hambali was furious and told his leaders to go ahead and push forward despite these setbacks. Then he took his key leaders and went to Thailand to work out Plan B.

In February 2002, Hambali gathered Mantiqi 1's top six leaders and pushed the plan forward. Al-Qaeda had already transferred the money, and explosives had been bought. It was a matter of adapting the plan so they could finish the job. At that meeting were Hambali, Mukhlas, Noordin Mohamed Top, Wan Min Wan Mat, Zulkifli Marzuki, and Dr. Azahari Husin. Specific jobs were handed out by Hambali. Noordin Mohamed Top, a teacher at Jemaah Islamiyah's Lukmanul Hakim school since 1998, was told "to plan bombing" logistics. Wan Min Wan Mat, a lecturer at Malaysia's Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) and Jemaah Islamiyah's treasurer, was named the plot's bagman. Dr. Azahari Husin, another lecturer at UTM and an engineer who studied in Britain, was Jemaah Islamiyah's top bomb expert and is the author of Jemaah Islamiyah's manuals on explosives and building bombs. Azahari was told "to arrange and execute" the explosives for the attack. Mukhlas, who replaced Hambali as the head of Mantiqi 1 in April 2001, was tasked with implementing the actual attack.

Mukhlas was a charter member of Jemaah Islamiyah and a veteran of the original jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He has known Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar since 1982, when he became a teacher at the Ngruki school in Solo that they founded. "I know the two vanished from the Ngruki boarding school around 1985 when the security forces came to the boarding school," said Mukhlas. In 1986, he left for Malaysia, where he again met up with the two clerics. That was when he said he swore allegiance to Abdullah Sungkar. Later that year, filled with the zeal of jihad, he left for Pakistan. "Jihad is the utmost form of religious service," he later told the Indonesian police. "After I decided to go, I performed the ritual prayer Istikharoh. In that prayer, I dreamt I met with the Prophet -- may Allah bless him and give him peace -- and he gave me some advice including an encouragement for me to depart because the journey was following the journey of the prophets, so I left at my own expense for Pakistan. And because I was able to speak Arabic I was able to talk with them and had the opportunity to meet with Islamic clerics," he said.

In 1987, he met Osama bin Laden in Joji, Afghanistan. "The Joji territory was under fierce attack by Russian soldiers," said Mukhlas. "The snow was very thick up to two meters. When the mujahideen prepared to hold an attack on Joji, I joined them. The leader of the mujahideen at Joji and also the camp owner was Sheik Osama bin Laden." In that same year, he also met a fellow Indonesian who would later rise up al-Qaeda's ranks: Hambali.

Mukhlas returned from Afghanistan when the war ended in 1989. He went to Malaysia and worked as a laborer and as an Islamic teacher. After about five or six months, he married Faridah bin Abbas, the sister of another JI member from Singapore, Hashim bin Abbas, whose voice would be heard narrating a JI plot on a videotape found in Afghanistan at the end of 2001.

In 1991, at the urging of the JI leaders, Mukhlas founded a JI school. Sungkar told him he should do this because he "had experienced living at the Islamic boarding school Ngruki, and in Malaysia, an Islamic boarding school teaching the Koran and Sunna was badly needed." The land was paid for by Sungkar. The school's maintenance and electricity bills were paid by Wan Min Wan Mat. Ba'asyir, Sungkar, Hambali, and Mukhlas used the school to preach their radical message and recruit their earliest disciples, including Imam Samudra, the Bali blast coordinator, and Mukhlas's younger brothers -- Amrozi, who bought the van and explosives for Bali, and Ali Imron, who confessed to helping make and set off the bombs.

The men who carried out the Bali bombings were no novices. This was not the first time they had worked together on a terrorist plot. They had planned and carried out the Christmas bombings in December 2000 in Indonesia and in Ambon -- nearly twenty bombs killed at least nineteen people. The same hierarchy, the same team: Hambali calling the shots; Mukhlas below him coordinating financial and logistical requirements; Imam Samudra as the field commander on the ground; Dr. Azahari advising Dulmatin the bomb maker; and Mukhlas's brothers Ali Imron, who built the bombs and triggered them, and Amrozi, who admitted using the same explosives supplier for the church bombings and the Ambon bombs.

Field commander Imam Samudra was the one who got the job done. An Afghan war veteran who had named his son Osama, he was trained as an engineer and computer expert. He developed his radical views by reading books and using the Internet. He became more radical, he admits, than even the Asian Osama bin Laden, Ba'asyir. "Ustad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir leans towards dakwah [missionary work] and the socialization of Islam while I realize that the society's needs go beyond that. Dakwah no longer suffices for the people. They also need a defense," says Samudra. "That is why I call to fellow Muslims through the Internet by summoning them to jihad in Ambon as well as Poso....For those not able, jihad can also be performed through infaq [donations]. The means which I use to call fellow Muslims to jihad is through the chatting channel on the Internet, by sending out URLs for websites I know." (After he was arrested, prosecutors found a great deal of communication with Ba'asyir on his laptop -- along with pornographic photographs of Anglo-Saxon women. Samudra insisted those files had been planted. At one point he lived in the Southeast Asian neighborhood known in intelligence communities as "Terror HQ" -- Sungai Manggis, Malaysia. There, Samudra lived next door to Hambali, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and Abu Jibril. Soon after, he attended the school set up by Mukhlas.

During the Christmas bombings, Samudra reported to Hambali and Mukhlas, and in turn, he managed Hashim bin Abbas, Mukhlas's brother-in-law. In 2001, he would field Malaysian Taufik Abdul Halim, a member of Malaysia's KMM terror group, in several church bombings, until one exploded prematurely, blowing off his leg and leading to his arrest.

Samudra not only used the Internet to coordinate his operatives; he also added an Asian twist: text messaging on cellular phones. According to law enforcement officials in the region, this is one of the hardest forms of communication to trace. Samudra ran various operatives on the ground: Idris was in charge of handling the money that came through Hambali, Wan Min Wan Mat, and Mukhlas and putting it to use in setting up accommodations and logistics; Dulmatin worked with Dr. Azahari above him and Ali Imron below him to make the bombs; Amrozi, Mukhlas's brother, bought the explosives from the same supplier as the Christmas Eve bombings. "I was given the job of finding the chemicals -- chlorate, aluminum powder and sulfur -- and of buying a car, any type of car but, if possible, try to get a car with Bali number plates," he later explained to police investigators.

Samudra also recruited a separate cell of five young men -- the suicide bombers for the plot. It would be the first time Indonesians would volunteer and carry out suicide bombings. "I asked them, 'Brothers, are you or are you not capable of going on a jihad on behalf of Muslims, even if it means a suicide bombing?' I noted that they shouldn't do it if they felt pressured or to be seen as courageous or to be popular or for any other bad reasons. They should do it only for Allah," said Samudra.

Samudra's operatives kept their targets at Kuta Beach in Bali under surveillance for three weeks. On October 9, 2002, just two nights before the bombing, Mukhlas arrived in Bali to take a look at the targets they chose: the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar. The Sari Club is a well-known hangout in Kuta that has earned the ire of many Indonesians. Patronized largely by foreigners, it's known as bule land -- the land of whites. A well-known pickup place, it often refused entry to single Indonesian women unless they were accompanied by white men. One Western-educated, pretty Indonesian woman complained to me that she and her friends were not allowed inside.

It was a good target, for it had symbolic importance that reverberated through all of Indonesian society. For three straight nights, Imam Samudra and two of his cell members positioned themselves outside, watching and feeding their hatred. "When we got to Jalan Legian," Imam Samudra later said, "we sat in the car in front of the Sari Club. I saw lots of whiteys dancing, and lots of whiteys drinking there. That place -- Kuta and especially Paddy's Bar and the Sari Club -- was a meeting place for U.S. terrorists and their allies, who the whole world knows to be the monsters."

A white L-300 Mitsubishi van and three chemicals for the explosives were brought to a house on Jalan Pulau Mejangan in Denpasar, Bali, on the morning of October 12, and the cell assembled the bombs. The seats had been taken out of the van, and twelve filing cabinets, full of chemicals -- potassium chlorate, sulfur, and aluminum powder -- were placed inside. "They put the three ingredients together, and there was a connecting cable and a detonator. Dulmatin knows about that," explains Colonel Zainuri Lubis, a member of the police investigating team. "He is the one who made the detonator, helped by Ali Imron. When everything was ready...they loaded [the cabinets] on gradually and then took the car to the scene of the crime."

There was some strain among the Bali bombers, particularly between Ali Imron and Imam Samudra. Ali Imron seemed to have felt marginalized during the planning stages, and during a bizarre press conference after his capture, where he acted more like a talk-show host than a prisoner, Imron portrayed himself as the key link: the man who built the bombs and pulled everything together at the last minute. "The capability of our group as one of the Indonesian nation [sic] should make people proud," Ali Imron told journalists, drawing stunned laughter from his implication that Indonesians should be proud of what his group accomplished.49 Imron said they used 1.2 tons of black powder connected to a cable detonator with PETN explosives. They also used 94 detonators that each had 3 grams of plastic explosive RDX and a booster that contained TNT. He said the detonators had been brought to Indonesia from the Philippines.

Samudra had chosen two suicide bombers to bring the van to the Sari Club, but at the last minute, the plotters discovered that one, Iqbal (an alias for Arnasan), who was supposed to drive the car, could drive only a short distance in a straight line -- he didn't know how to shift gears or turn corners. Samudra ordered a displeased Imron to drive the van to a T-junction close to the targets with Iqbal and the second suicide bomber, Jimi (wearing a vest full of explosives), alongside. At the intersection, Ali Imron got out, and Iqbal drove the remaining short distance. At the Sari Club, Jimi got out of the van and entered the club, while Iqbal stayed in the van. The plotters set up four separate ways of detonating the bomb, providing three different backup systems in case of failure. The first attempt would be by mobile phone; then a direct trigger switch to be pulled by Iqbal, then a timer in case Iqbal was incapacitated, and finally a trigger in one of the filing cabinet drawers set to go off if it was opened.

Ali Imron said that the first method must not have been used because they had forgotten to attach the cell phone. "The remote, the handphone, is still in the pocket of my friend, Idris."

On October 12, 2002, at 9:00 P.M., Ali Imron placed a box-shaped bomb on the sidewalk outside the U.S. consular office in Bali. He then rode a Yamaha motorcycle back to the house to get the van. At 10:00 P.M., Ali Imron drove the van to the T-junction near the Sari Club. At 11:08 P.M., Idris used his cell phone to make a call to trigger an explosion outside the U.S. consular office. By that time, Jimi, with the vestful of explosives, was inside Paddy's bar and detonated his bomb. That smaller explosion was designed to funnel people to the exit, closer to the site of the van's largest and deadliest blast, so fierce it ruptured the internal organs of the people in the area. The fires that followed burned others alive. The roofs of surrounding buildings were made of thatched material, which magnified the explosions, tearing down a whole city block. More than two hundred people died, and hundreds more were injured in a scene of chaos, destruction, and death.

The bombers rejoiced. Some of them went to pray. Like the 9/11 attacks, the result surpassed what they had imagined would happen. "Firstly, I was shocked because the explosion was extremely intense, beyond expectations," said Mukhlas. "I had estimated that only Sari Club and Paddy's would be destroyed. Secondly, I felt grateful because in my opinion, the planned mission and objectives had been achieved because there were many casualties from amongst American allies including Australian citizens. Thirdly, I sought Allah's forgiveness because apparently there were some victims from the Muslim side."

Amrozi, who by that time had returned to his hometown of Tenggulun, but was nonetheless caught by authorities on November 5, 2002, said he believed foreigners threatened the future of Indonesia. "Because the evil plan of the United States, the Jews and their allies is to colonize," he said. "They want to destroy religions. They destroy by creating challenges to religions, that is, dens of vices" -- referring to the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar. Indonesia's moral fabric was collapsing, said Amrozi, because "foreigners have colonized late night television. What would happen to Bali in ten years if I hadn't bombed it?" he asked the court. "For sure, the morals of Indonesians would be severely ruined because most people would not be going to mosques, churches and temples. The Jews, the Americans and their puppets know very well how to destroy the lives of Indonesians. Destroying our morals is very important to them." Another phrase I heard repeatedly from the Bali bombers was that "there was no other choice but violence."

Imam Samudra stayed in Bali for two days after the bombing and revisited the site to survey the destruction. "I felt that I feared only Allah," he said, "and that my efforts, which had been so small, had caused the deaths of so many people. But if those killed were not Muslims but Americans and Christians, then I was grateful." Later, Samudra created his own website, www.istimata.com, to justify the Bali bombings. His words are strong and passionate.

"This site is not intended as a forum for debate," he wrote. "This site has been created so that Muslims understand that -- quite apart from whether they agree or not, are opposed or not -- there are a handful of Muslims who feel called to revenge the barbarity of the Coalition army of the Cross and its allies (America, England, Australia, Germany, Belgium, Japan, almost all members of NATO, and so on) toward the Islamic State of Afghanistan, which resulted in tens of thousands of casualties in September, 2001.

"It is as if one believer and another have the same body -- if one feels the pain, the other also feels it. For all you Christian infidels! If you say that this killing was barbarous and cruel, and happened to 'innocent civilians' from your countries, then you should know that you do crueler things than that. Do you think that 600 thousand babies in Iraq and half a million Afghan children and their mothers are soldiers and sinful people who should have to endure thousands of tons of your bombs?!?!?

"Where are your brains and your consciences?

"The cries of babies and the screams of Muslim women, which are then conveyed by the diplomatic efforts of a handful of Muslims trying to stop your brutality have not been successful, and there is no way they will ever be able to stop your barbarity.

"So here we are, Muslims!!!

"Our hearts have been wounded and are filled with pain at the deaths of our brothers and sisters. We cannot allow unjust and barbarous actions against our Muslim brothers and sisters in any corner of the world.

"We hereby state that we were responsible for the MARTYRS (SUICIDE BOMBING) that took place in Jalan Legian, Kuta, Bali, on the evening of Saturday, October 12, 2002, and in the vicinity of the American embassy in Jalan Hayam Wuruk, Denpasar, Bali, on the same night."

Samudra threatened to continue the attacks unless three conditions are met: first, for coalition forces to leave Afghanistan: "As long as Coalition forces do not leave Afghanistan, there will continue to be casualties from your countries, wherever they may be." Second was the release of all Muslims held as terrorists: "As long as you regard our brothers and sisters as terrorists and torture them in your prisons, especially in Guantanamo Bay, citizens from your countries will receive the same treatment." Finally, he asked all Muslims to stop helping and supporting the "American infidels who spread slander in Muslim circles" and threatened to treat them "the same way we treat your master, America, oppressor and mastermind of world terrorism."

In a separate website about three weeks after the blasts, al-Qaeda claimed credit for Samudra's and his terror network's handiwork, including the Bali blasts, in its list of global attacks against America and its allies. "By attempting to strike a U.S. plane in Saudi Arabia and by bombing a Jewish synagogue in Tunisia, destroying two ships in Yemen, attacking the Fialka base in Kuwait, and bombing nightclubs and whorehouses in Indonesia, Al-Qaeda has shown it has no qualms about attacking inside Arab and Islamic lands," said the statement on the website. "This is provided that the target belongs to the Jewish-Crusader alliance."

Practically speaking, there is no difference between al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, as the latter operates as a subsidiary of the former. The Bali bombing was indeed the work of al-Qaeda, which provided funds, training, and some of the personnel to supplement Jemaah Islamiyah's home-grown recruiting. It was on orders from Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda's number two (while he was still alive), that Jemaah Islamiyah switched from Plan A in Singapore to Plan B in Bali. The ease with which massive explosives were obtained -- enough to kill over 200 people -- and the relative simplicity of the plan make it a virtual certainty that something like it will happen again.

Copyright © 2003 by Maria A. Ressa