Inside the Soviet Army

New York, N.Y.: Berkley Books, 1986. Fifth Printing [stated]. Mass market paperback. Good. xi, [1], 352, [4] pages. Some red underlining and marks noted. Includes Foreword by General Sir John Hackett, Conclusion, and Index. Also includes chapters on The Higher Military Leadership; Types of Armed Services; Combat Organisation; Mobilisation; Strategy and Tactics; Equipment; The Soldier's Lot; and The Officer's Path. This window opened into the armed forces of the Soviet Union is unique. This was a selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club. the Military Book Club, and the Conservative Book Club. Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun (born 20 April 1947), known by his pseudonym of Viktor Suvorov, became known as a Russian non-fiction author after he defected to the United Kingdom in 1978. Of Russian-Ukrainian ancestry, Suvorov attended Russian military schools, was a veteran of the armed forces (including the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia), and had worked as a Soviet military intelligence officer in the Soviet Union. While next working as an intelligence agent for the UK, Suvorov began his writing career, publishing his first non-fiction books in the 1980s about his own experiences and the structure of Soviet military, intelligence, and secret police. He writes in Russian. A number of his books have been translated into English, including his semi-autobiographical The Liberators (1981). Among his works is Icebreaker (1980s), based on an analysis of Soviet military investments, diplomatic maneuvers, Politburo speeches and other circumstantial evidence. Inside the Soviet Army is a book by Viktor Suvorov (published under his pseudonym), which describes the general organization, doctrine, and strategy of the Soviet armed forces (the term "Army" being used to cover not only the land force, but also strategic rocket, air defense, air, and naval forces). United States military reviewers described this book as one of the most important in its field published in the previous decade. Suvorov, a former veteran and intelligence agent, explains his view on Soviet political realities. He portrays the military as an institution in which everything is subordinated to maintain the communist regime's dominance, thus explaining the rationale behind Soviet strategic planning. Marxism is treated as a science to govern military strategy as well. He notes that at the time, three forces were always at work with the military: the Party, through the Politburo; the KGB; and the Soviet Army officers and hierarchy. He describes the organization of the Soviet armed forces, from the top down, emphasizing the land forces/Soviet Army. Technical details are presented when they are useful, but he is primarily concerned with explaining the underlying philosophy and culture. He often contrasts these with the Western military approach. Suvorov concludes with descriptions of the daily life inside the Soviet Army for the soldier and the officer, including the bullying and the hazing known as dedovshchina. This was almost unknown in the West when he published his book. It has since been reported as notorious in the Russian Ground Forces of the post-Soviet period and contributing to poor morale.
In "An Insider's Warning to the West", Lt. Col. Gregory Varhall and Major Kenneth M. Currie note that in this book, Suvorov "regards the Soviet military as a formidable adversary despite its shortcomings." They say that it gave the "first comprehensive look inside the Soviet military since The Penkovsky Papers." The reviewers note that Suvorov emphasizes how different the "experiential and cognitive basis" is for Soviet actions, compared to those of the US. Allan Weeks noted in footnote #16 to his article, "The Soviet View Toward Prognostication" (1983), that Suvorov had emphasized in this book, in Part 5: "Strategy and Tactics," that the Soviets' offensive strategy was directed at using what they believed to be their superior prediction skills to catch the US and other Western nations off guard. Suvorov noted their success in the surprise invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and said that there was a Chief Directorate for Strategic Camouflage.