Stalin and the Bomb; The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994. Presumed First Edition/First Printing. Hardcover. Very good/very good. 24 cm. xvi, 464, illus., bookplate, DJ slightly worn and soiled, erasure on front endpaper. David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, and a professor of political science. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into six languages. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals. Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986, Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). He received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his Ph.D. in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University. This magisterial history throws light on Soviet policy on atomic energy at the height of the Cold War, illuminating a central but hitherto secret element of the Stalinist system. 'Stalin and the Bomb' represents a comprehensive history of Soviet nuclear policy, from developments in physics in the 1920s to the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s. The author looks at how the bombs were built, and the role that espionage played. Based on Kirkus review: Using interviews with some of the main protagonists, such as Kapitsa and Sakharov, and access to those archives that have become available in Russia, Holloway addresses a number of issues. He confirms that the Soviets were dependent on spying to understand British how the British and the Americans were pursuing nuclear weapons, and guidelines to their methods. The building of the hydrogen bomb was largely an indigenous Soviet achievement. Little credit seems due to Stalin, who was responsible for shooting many of the top physicists during the purges and who understood the significance of nuclear weapons only after the explosion at Alamogordo. Holloway concludes that Stalin's refusal to be browbeaten made the US more cautious about asserting its nuclear monopoly. What could have been a dry technical and analytical study is enlivened by the immensity of the issues at stake and the extraordinary characters populating the story.